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Creditor Rights and R&D Expenditures
Bruce Seifert and Halit Gonenc
ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: This study examines the impact of creditor rights on R&D intensity (R&D/total assets). We argue
that managers in countries with strong creditor rights have more incentives to reduce cash flow risk and therefore limit
expenditures on R&D more than managers located in countries with weak creditor rights.
Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of over 21,000 firms from 41 countries, our research is one of the first to
document that strong creditor rights are indeed associated with reduced R&D intensity. This negative relationship is
observed in market-based countries, but not in bank-based countries. Moreover, the results show that the negative effect of
creditor rights on R&D intensity is usually stronger (more negative) for firms facing or near financial distress. We observe
that the determinants for R&D intensity consist of both country and firm level variables and firm level variables appear to
be more important in explaining the variance of R&D intensity.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study documents an important link between creditor rights and R&D intensity.
Our empirical procedure specifically accounts for the fact that R&D intensity and debt are likely to be jointly determined.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This research is important to policy makers interested in understanding the determinants
of firms’ R&D intensity. In particular, our study suggests a possible harmful effect of strong creditor rights, namely the
possibility that R&D intensity will be lowered.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Creditor Rights, Corporate Innovation, R&D Intensity
INTRODUCTION
R &D can be extremely important to both companies andcountries. At the firm level, successful R&D invest-
ments can lead to new and better products and cheaper ways
to manufacture them and therefore to increased cash flows.
At the country level, those investments can be a catalyst for
economic growth.1 R&D expenditures can be substantial.
Israel, for example, spends over four per cent of its GDP on
R&D and the US is forecasted to spend more than 400 billion
dollars in R&D in 2011.2
While stockholders generally have a favorable view of
R&D3 because they get to reap most of the benefits, creditors
have mixed emotions about R&D spending. On the one hand,
creditors realize that for many companies R&D investments
are essential and these firms cannot ultimately survive
without it. On the other hand, creditors worry that R&D
expenditures may not be successful and therefore earnings
and cash flows will be less than desired and possibly, that
their promised payments in terms of interest and principal
will not materialize. R&D spending is risky. Not only are
outcomes highly uncertain but there is a great chance that
R&D on a particular project/area will not be successful. Even
if R&D turns out to be successful, it may be years before the
benefits show up. The fact that there is a huge variance of
outcomes associated with R&D intensity (R&D/total assets)
and the fact that creditors do not share in any of the profits
above their promised payouts make creditors wary about
spending for R&D. Creditors will likely focus on the
increased risk of more R&D intensity and not the additional
benefits because they do not get any extra cash flow above
their promised payments and therefore will probably prefer
less to more spending on R&D. Shi (2003) provides empirical
support for the idea that bondholders are worried more
about the risk of R&D intensity than its benefits.
Creditors have many powers and use their powers to
influence corporate decisions. Traditionally many research-
ers stressed the powers of creditors during periods of bank-
ruptcy. More recently, researchers have documented the
influence of creditors in investment decisions (Nini, Smith,
& Sufi, 2009), capital structure choices (Roberts & Sufi, 2009),
shareholder payouts (Brockman & Unlu, 2009) and innova-
tive activities (Acharya & Subramanian, 2009). Creditors
have powers because when a firm violates a private credit
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agreement, the agreement is generally renegotiated (as
opposed to being called) and the terms of the agreement
change as additional restrictions (for example, less invest-
ments, less debt, and fewer payouts) are imposed on the
firm.
When firms are close to financial distress, managers will
likely take actions to prevent this possibility. Managers who
fear that financial distress is a possibility may undertake
actions designed to reduce risk such as diversifying opera-
tions, employing less debt, and reducing capital expendi-
tures. Strong creditor rights may make managers’ lives
worse during these times. Managers may discover that
under strong creditor rights their decision-making powers
are reduced more and the possibility of losing their jobs is
greater than under weak creditor rights. Under these cir-
cumstances, it would seem reasonable that managers might
try more risk reducing activities under strong creditor rights
than under weak creditor rights.
Recent studies (Acharya, Amihud, & Litov, 2011; Acharya
& Subramanian, 2009) indicate that managers in firms
located in countries with strong creditor rights do, in fact,
engage in more diversifying acquisitions, which result in
poorer performance. These managers also lower cash flow
risk, lower leverage, and have fewer innovations. Our paper
focuses on another avenue managers might take to reduce
risk, which is to limit R&D expenditures. We examine
whether R&D intensity is, on average, greater in countries
with weak creditor rights than in countries with strong
creditor rights.
Our paper is one of the first to examine the linkage
between creditor rights and R&D intensity. We investigate
this relationship using data for more than 140,000 firm-year
observations belonging to over 21,000 firms from 41 coun-
tries. To account for the fact that R&D intensity and debt are
likely jointly determined, our empirical procedure treats
both R&D intensity and the debt ratio as endogenous. Our
analysis also specifically incorporates the impact of intellec-
tual property rights on R&D decisions.
Our regressions and correlation analysis suggest that
strong creditor rights decrease R&D intensity across all of
our samples with the exception of bank-based countries. In
general, we find that the impact of creditor rights is more
negative for firms that are in financial distress or near
financial distress. Our results are consistent with the view
that managers worry more about the negative conse-
quences of financial distress (for themselves and their
company) in countries that have strong creditor rights than
in countries with weak creditor rights. As a result, firms
reduce risk more in countries with strong creditor rights.
One of these risk-reducing strategies is limiting R&D
intensity.
Another important finding of our research is that deter-
minants of R&D intensity are largely invariant across our
samples. In addition to the generally negative impact of
creditor rights on R&D intensity, we find that patent rights,
market to book ratios, and equity ratios all have a positive
impact on R&D intensity while concentrated ownership has
a negative influence. We observe that the determinants for
R&D intensity consist of both country and firm level vari-
ables and firm level variables appear to be more important in
explaining the variance of R&D intensity.
In addition, the determinants of the leverage equation (in
our case the equity ratio) are basically the same across our
samples. Cash flow and market to book ratios both have a
positive effect on the firm’s use of equity, while size and a
measure of adverse selection reduce the amount of equity
employed by firms.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we
briefly review some relevant literature and then we describe
the data, our hypotheses, and our methodology. We then
present our findings and finally our conclusions.
RELEVANT LITERATURE
R&D Investment and Financing of R&D
A number of authors (for example, Bhagat & Welch, 1995)
have argued that R&D can be viewed as an investment for a
firm. There are, however, differences between these expen-
ditures and other investments. As Hall (2002) points out, 50
per cent or more of the expenditures for R&D can be tied up
in salaries and wages of scientists and engineers. Since the
knowledge base of these key individuals can be lost if these
people are fired or leave the firm, R&D intensity should
remain relatively constant year to year. Another difference
between R&D and other investments is that there is a high
degree of uncertainty (outcomes) associated with these
expenditures. As Hall argues, there is a small probability of
great success attached to R&D expenditures.
A problem that is likely worse for R&D than for other
investments is the information asymmetric issue. Scientists,
engineers, and insiders have more information than inves-
tors do, and firm insiders do not want to reveal this infor-
mation to outsiders (especially their competitors) to solve
this problem (Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983). Bhagat and
Welch (1995) and Bah and Dumontier (2001) argue that this
can explain the use of internally generated funds to support
R&D intensity.
Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) find that
there is a positive relationship between R&D intensity and
cash flow4 for US firms. Brown and Petersen (2009) show
that the relationship between R&D and cash flow is still
strong, unlike the relationship between physical investment
and cash flow that has decreased over the years. Brown,
Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) observe a significant relation-
ship between cash flow (as well as external equity) and R&D
intensity for young high-tech companies, but not for mature
high-tech firms.
Research has shown that stronger intellectual property
rights leads to more R&D intensity [see, for example, Wu
(2009) for OECD countries and Lin, Lin, and Song (2010) for
evidence from China]. Firms should conduct more R&D if
they feel there is little chance that their R&D efforts will be
stolen or imitated.
It has also been argued that debt should not be used to
finance R&D. In most cases R&D does not have much liqui-
dation value in the event of bankruptcy. In addition, firms
with high R&D expenditures probably reflect high growth
opportunities and hence suffer from the underinvestment
problem (Myers, 1977) and thus equity is probably better
suited to finance R&D. Bhagat and Welch (1995) show that
there is a negative relation between last year’s debt ratio for
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US firms and this year’s R&D expenditures. However, they
found that this same relation was positive for Japanese firms
and no significant relation was found for Canadian, British,
and European (Germany, France, and Netherlands) firms.
Friend and Lang (1988) and Hall (1992) also find a negative
relationship for US firms between leverage and R&D expen-
ditures. Bah and Dumontier (2001) find that R&D intensive
firms have lower leverage levels than non-intensive R&D for
firms in the US, UK, Japan, and Europe.
In summary, prior literature suggests that R&D intensity
should be positively related to intellectual property rights
and cash flow. Research has also shown the importance of
equity financing for R&D.
Ownership Structure and Corporate Practices
on R&D
A number of researchers have examined different types of
ownership structures to see if some are more conducive to
R&D. Francis and Smith (1995) find some evidence that
firms with a high percentage of management ownership or
firms that have a significant blockholder perform more R&D
than firms whose shares are widely held. These results are
consistent with the idea that concentrated ownership
and/or monitoring can reduce agency costs of innovation.
On the other hand, Yafeh and Yosha (2003) find that concen-
trated ownership (defined as the total ownership of the 10
largest shareholders) is associated with less R&D intensity
for a sample of Japanese firms.
Other researchers have examined in more depth whether
large shareholders help to promote R&D. Empirical findings
have been mixed. See, for example, Wahal and McConnell
(2000), Graves (1988), and Chung, Wright, and Media (2003)
for the impact of institutional shareholders on R&D inten-
sity. Tribo, Berrone, and Surroca (2007) find that the impact
of large blockholders on R&D intensity depends on the type
of blockholder. Banks have a negative influence, non-
financial corporations have a positive impact and individu-
als have an insignificant influence. Some academics have
focused on the impact of corporate practices on R&D. Lhuil-
lery (2009), for example, finds that shareholder-oriented
governance practices increase R&D intensity.
Scholars have also studied whether reducing the likeli-
hood of hostile takeovers encourages more R&D. One pos-
sibility is that if the probability of hostile takeovers is
lowered, managers become more entrenched and thus less
likely to conduct R&D. On the other hand, some researchers
have argued that the threat of hostile takeovers makes man-
agers worry about short-term performance and if freed from
that threat will concentrate more on long-term goals and do
more R&D. The research has been decidedly mixed as to
whether R&D intensity increases subsequent to antitakeover
amendments (e.g., Johnson & Rao, 1997; Meulbroek, Mitch-
ell, Mulherin, Netter, & Poulsen, 1990; Pugh, Page, & Jahera,
1992).5 In summary, a firm’s ownership structure and its
corporate practices likely affect its expenditures on R&D.
Creditor Rights and Shareholder Rights
There are a number of studies that have documented the
effect of shareholder and creditor rights on different corpo-
rate policies. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (2000) show that investors from countries that have
strong minority shareholder rights obtain higher dividends
than investors residing in countries that have low minority
shareholder rights. These authors argue that their results
support the “outcome model” where minority stockholders
are able to extract dividends by using their legal powers
(more rights lead to more dividends). The alternative model
suggested by La Porta et al. (2000) is the “substitution
model” where firms pay dividends now in order to be able
to raise additional capital in the future. In this model, it is the
firms residing in countries with poor minority stockholder
rights that need to pay dividends in order to build a repu-
tation of being fair to these shareholders. Shareholder rights
have also been found to influence investment policies (Love,
2003) and ownership policies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998, 1999).
More recently, Brockman and Unlu (2009) show that
creditors influence dividend payouts significantly. In this
case, creditors demand and managers agree to pay fewer
dividends when creditor rights are weak. Their results are
consistent with a “substitution model” (less dividends
substitute for weak creditor rights). Nini et al. (2009) also
demonstrate the power creditors have on their ability to
influence investment policy. These authors find that 32 per
cent of private credit agreements between banks and firms
have a capital expenditure restriction.6 The authors show
that these restrictions are effective in reducing firm invest-
ment. Roberts and Sufi (2009) find that creditors have a
significant effect on capital structure. Issues of net debt
decrease after debt covenant violations, causing changes in
capital structure. It should be noted that more than 25 per
cent of the firms in their sample experienced a violation in
their covenants. Acharya et al. (2011) observe that firms in
countries with strong creditor rights are more likely to
engage in harmful diversifying mergers, have lower cash
flow risk, and lower leverage, than companies in countries
with weak creditor rights. Acharya and Subramanian
(2009) find that firms in countries with strong creditor
rights are more likely to reduce innovation measured in
terms of patents and citations.
In summary, the results of many prior studies indicate that
shareholder rights and creditor rights can and do influence
corporate policies. Our research examines whether creditor
rights in particular, similarly affect expenditures on R&D.7
HYPOTHESES
Our principle hypothesis is that firms located in countries
with strong creditor rights will have lower R&D intensity.
We justify this hypothesis by first noting that creditors are
wary about expenditures for R&D since these outflows
produce highly uncertain returns. Creditors share in the fail-
ures of R&D but do not reap any of the extra gains when
R&D is successful since their promised payments are fixed.
Shi’s (2003) research shows that bondholders focus on the
risk of R&D and not the benefits of R&D. In most cases,
creditors will prefer less rather than more R&D intensity.
Second, we observe that creditors have powers beyond
bankruptcy and they use these powers to influence
CREDITOR RIGHTS AND R&D EXPENDITURES 5
Volume 20 Number 1 January 2012© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
corporate policies. In particular, research (Acharya & Subra-
manian, 2009; Acharya et al., 2011; Nini et al., 2009) indicates
that managers in firms located in countries with strong
creditor rights engage in activities designed to reduce the
variance of cash flows (diversifying acquisitions, lower
leverage, less investments and fewer innovations). Third, we
note that management will likely pursue risk-reducing strat-
egies, especially in times of financial distress. The greater are
the powers of creditors, the more likely management will
perform risk-reducing activities, which includes reducing
R&D intensity since some of the consequences of financial
distress (loss of decision-making and possible loss of jobs)
are worse under strong creditor rights than under weak
creditor rights. Moreover, Acharya et al. (2011) argue that in
cases of default, strong creditor rights may lead to inefficient
liquidation thus hurting shareholder value even more.
Therefore, strong creditor rights create high costs for both
managers and shareholders in cases of default and/or dis-
tress and both parties will agree to strategies (including
reducing R&D investments) designed to reduce the risk of
default and distress. In summary, under strong creditor
rights, creditors, stockholders, and management will often
see that it is in their best interest to reduce R&D intensity.
Hypothesis 1 is as follows:
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative relationship between creditor
rights and R&D intensity.
There is a large literature devoted to addressing whether
bank-based systems (where banks supply most of the
financing needs of firms) or market-based systems (where
equity and public bond markets supply a large percentage of
firms’ financing needs) encourage or support R&D more.8 A
number of studies (see, for example, Beck & Levine, 2002)
suggest that the distinction between market-based and
bank-based is not critical when it comes to economic
growth. More recently, Hillier, Pintado, de Queiroz, and de
la Torre (2011) report that bank-based systems are better
than market-based systems in reducing the sensitivity of
R&D intensity to a firms’ internal cash flow.
We next examine whether the financial structure of a
country (market or bank-based) influences the link between
creditor rights and R&D intensity. Our hypothesis concern-
ing creditor rights and R&D intensity should be applicable
in market-based countries as creditors, stockholders, and
management should agree to reduce R&D intensity when
creditor rights are strong.
It is an empirical question as to whether Hypothesis 1
holds in bank-based countries. It is not clear how important
creditor rights are to banks. On one hand, banks may be
willing to lend more for R&D intensity if creditor rights are
strong. On the other hand, firms may not want to borrow
more for R&D if the consequences of financial distress are
worse under strong creditor rights than under weak creditor
rights. Also creditor rights may be largely irrelevant for
banks if banks have other mechanisms to force repayment.
Our second hypothesis is stated as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The negative relationship between creditor
rights and R&D intensity is stronger in market-based coun-
tries as compared to bank-based countries.
Many managers are scared of the consequences of financial
distress and will do their best to avoid it. We argue that
strong creditor rights will increase the negative conse-
quences of financial distress to managers (loss of decision-
making and increased possibility of job loss). We proxy
financial distress or close to financial distress as observations
that have negative cash flows. Managers will probably
increase their efforts to avoid financial distress and therefore
will reduce R&D intensity more under strong creditor rights
than under weak creditor rights. This leads us to our third
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The negative effect of creditor rights on R&D
intensity is stronger for firms that are in financial distress or
close to financial distress.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
Our financial data is gathered from Worldscope from 1980 to
2006 for 41 countries. We exclude financial firms and utilities
and thus avoid any regulatory influences. Data from World-
scope does contain some errors and thus we winsorize the
data. The top and bottom 1 per cent of all of our financial
variables are set equal to the values for the 99 and 1 per cent
level respectively for those variables. Hence, extreme outli-
ers are eliminated.
For creditor rights we use the index by Djankov, McLiesh,
and Shleifer (2007) that determines the powers of secured
lenders during bankruptcy for the year 2003. Countries are
scored according to four attributes. They are: “1) whether
there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, when a
debtor files for reorganization; 2) whether secured creditors
are able to seize their collateral after the petition for reorga-
nization is approved, that is, whether there is no automatic
stay or asset freeze imposed by the court; 3) whether secured
creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a
bankrupt firm; and 4) whether an administrator, and not
management, is responsible for running the business during
reorganization.” (Djankov et al., 2007:302). This index has
been stable over the period 1978–2003.
A number of studies have shown that patent protection is
a good indicator of intellectual property rights (see, for
example, Marron & Steel, 2000 and Ostergard, 2000) and
thus we use the patent protection index of Ginarte and Park
(1997) and Park (2008). This index considers five areas: (1)
extent of coverage, (2) membership in international patent
agreements, (3) provisions for loss of protection, (4) enforce-
ment mechanisms, and (5) duration of protection (Ginarte &
Park, 1997:284).9 In unreported results, we find that the cor-
relations between intellectual property rights indices over
five year intervals are high, indicating that there is a lot of
stability over time in the index.
Table 1 lists all the variables used in this study and gives
exact definitions for each of them.
Methodology
We investigate our hypotheses using the following two-
equation system.
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We hypothesize that a firm’s R&D intensity is a function of
its equity ratio, country’s creditor rights index, cash flow,
market to book ratio, country’s level of intellectual property
rights, whether the firm is in a high tech industry or not, and
ownership structure. A firm’s equity ratio is a function of
its R&D intensity, country’s creditor rights index, cash
flow, market to book ratio, size, and measure of adverse
selection.11
We use a two-equation system because it is likely that both
R&D intensity and debt policy (equity ratio) are endog-
enous. A firm probably makes both decisions jointly and,
furthermore, the decision of one likely influences the other
decision. As was previously discussed, R&D intensity
should have a negative influence on leverage. Firms for
many reasons prefer to fund R&D mostly with equity. On
the other hand, Jensen and Showalter (2004) present a model
where the amount of leverage affects total R&D expendi-
tures. In a patent race these authors show that debt reduces
the amount of R&D expenditures. As a result, we use two-
stage least squares to estimate the coefficients for Equations
1 and 2.
For the R&D intensity equation, greater use of equity
should lead to greater amounts of R&D intensity. Firms
residing in countries with greater intellectual property
rights should conduct more R&D since the fruits of their
labors are more likely to remain within the firm (i.e., not get
stolen or illegally imitated). Assuming that external funds
are more expensive than internal funds, greater cash flows
should lead, on the margin, to more R&D intensity. Higher
market to book ratios should indicate more investment
opportunities and this should be associated with more R&D
intensity. To account for the fact that certain industries his-
torically do a lot of R&D, we use a dummy variable that
equals one for firms in those industries. The impact of the
per cent of shares held by insiders and influential outsiders
is unclear on R&D intensity.12 On one hand, increased own-
ership may align managers and blockholders to shareholder
interests and increase R&D intensity. On the other hand,
increased ownership by management may cause entrench-
ment and less R&D intensity. Also, increased ownership by
blockholders may increase monitoring and reduce R&D
intensity.
Our R&D equation has the direction of causation from
more intellectual property rights to more R&D intensity.
One could argue that as firms and countries do more R&D




R&D Intensity Research and Development Intensity (R&D Expenditures / Book Value of Total Assets)
Equity Ratio [Market Value of Equity / (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Total Short and
Long-term Debt)]
Creditor Rights Country level scores from Djankov et al. (2007).
Cash Flow [(Net income + Depreciation + R&D expenditures) / Book Value of Total Assets]
Market to Book [(Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Debt) / Book Value of Total Assets]
Property Rights The patent rights index for 1985 from Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008).
High Tech Industries A dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the firm is in the following SIC codes 283 (drugs),
357 (office and computing equipment), 366 (communications equipment), 367 (electronic
equipment), 382 (scientific instruments), 384 (medical instruments) and 737 (software) and
0 otherwise.
Size The logarithm of book value of total assets in US dollars.
Adverse Selection The standard deviation of monthly excess returns (Firm Stock Return – Local Market Return).




Market and bank-based countries are defined in Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) and
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002).
Developed and
Developing countries
Developed and Developing countries are defined according to income classification of the
World Bank. High-income economies are classified as developed countries, and low-income
and middle-income economies are classified as developing countries.
This table provides exact definitions of all variables. All data is from Worldscope unless otherwise noted.
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However, Kanwar and Evenson (2009) and Wu (2009) find
that the link running from R&D to property rights is weak or
non-existent. In addition, we use the property rights index at
the beginning of our data period to reduce possible endoge-
neity issues.
For the equity ratio equation, we include many of the
traditional leverage variables used in prior studies (see, for
example, Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Since we are using the
equity ratio instead of the leverage ratio, the signs for the
coefficients on the independent variables should be just
the opposite of the leverage ratio. The R&D intensity vari-
able can be thought of as the ratio of an intangible asset to
total assets and should have, as discussed above, a positive
influence on the equity ratio. Greater cash flow, all other
things being equal, should lead to a lower need for debt and
hence have a positive influence on the equity ratio. High
market to book ratios can indicate increased investment
opportunities, which are associated with increased use of
equity. Larger size can result in more diversified cash flows
and less bankruptcy risk and hence more debt financing or
less equity financing. Finally, we include a measure of
adverse selection. All other things being equal, greater
amounts of information asymmetry should lead to less use
of equity.
The effect of creditor rights on the equity ratio is ambigu-
ous. On one hand, stronger creditor rights should result in
more people and institutions willing to lend money to firms
(due to the increased chance of getting their investment
returned) and hence leverage would increase. Djankov et al.
(2007) report an increase in the supply of credit due to stron-
ger creditor rights. On the other hand, firms may decrease
the demand for credit because of stronger creditor rights.
Acharya et al. (2011) find that leverage is reduced as a result




Panels A and B of Table 2 provide descriptive statistics for
our main variables. The mean (median) ratio of R&D to total
assets is .026 (.000). Most firms do not report positive
amounts of R&D in a given year, as 58 per cent of our yearly
observations have zero R&D (data not reported in Table 2).
Firms in Israel and the US have the two highest averages.
Some countries report no R&D activity, which may indicate
that only a little R&D takes place in that country, or alterna-
tively, that R&D is underreported.
The equity ratio is measured as the ratio of the market
value of equity to the sum of the market value of equity and
the book value of debt (both short-term and long-term).
Using market values of equity instead of book values of
equity helps to minimize any impact of different accounting
conventions in different countries. The mean and median of
the equity ratio for the companies in our sample are .761 and
.829.
Firms in our sample, generally, have a positive cash flow.
It should be recalled that our measure of cash flow is net
income plus depreciation plus R&D all divided by total
assets, which should give a little higher number than the
more traditional measure of net income plus depreciation all
divided by total assets. The intellectual property rights index
in our sample has a low of .59 (Peru) and a high of 4.68
(United States). The average is 3.7. Creditor rights range
from 0 to 4 with an average of 1.83.
Panel B of Table 2 reports statistical comparisons for the
mean and median values between developing and devel-
oped countries and between bank-based and market-based
countries. The level of R&D intensity is higher in developed
and market-based countries. When we exclude US firms,
more R&D intensity is actually performed in bank-based
countries than in market-based ones. Firms in developed
countries and in market-based countries use more equity
than firms in developing countries and in bank-based
countries.
Correlation Results
Panel A of Table 3 presents the country correlation coeffi-
cient between creditor rights and property rights. The rela-
tionship is positive but insignificant. Panel B of Table 3 gives
the correlation coefficients for the firm level variables used
in the regressions. The correlations in this Panel show that
creditor rights is significantly negatively related to R&D
intensity (consistent with Hypothesis 1) and property rights
is significantly positively associated with R&D intensity.
Panel B shows that R&D intensity is positively related to
the equity ratio, high tech industries dummy, and market to
book ratio and negatively related to cash flow and owner-
ship. All of these relationships are as expected except for
cash flows. Moreover, the equity ratio is positively associ-
ated with market to book and cash flow and negatively
related to size, creditor rights, and adverse selection.
Panel C gives the Variance Inflationary Factors (VIF) for
the two equations. All the VIF are under 2 indicating no
problems of multicollinearity.
Regression Results
We present our basic regression results in Table 4. This table
reports the results for firms from all countries (Panel A), all
countries excluding the US (Panel B), market and bank-
based countries (Panels C and D) and developed and devel-
oping countries (Panels E and F). We examine all firms
minus US firms to see if US firms are driving our main
results.
Before presenting our regression results, we note that tests
for endogeneity (see Wooldridge, 2000) show that the equity
ratio is endogenous in the R&D intensity equation, while
R&D intensity is endogenous in the equity ratio equation.
These results suggest that a two-equation system is
appropriate.
All Countries With and Excluding the US
R&D Intensity Equation. Our main result in Panels A
and B in Table 4 is that strong creditor rights acts to reduce
R&D intensity, findings that support Hypothesis 1. The coef-
ficient for creditor rights is strongly significant when all
countries are included or when all countries minus the US
are examined.
8 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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TABLE 4
Two Stage Regression Results
Panel A: All countries Panel B: All countries excluding the US Panel C: Market-based countries
R&D Intensity Equity Ratio R&D Intensity Equity Ratio R&D Intensity Equity Ratio
Intercept -.04*** .93*** -.02*** .93*** -.04*** .92***
[.00] [.00] [.00] [.01] [.00] [.00]
Equity ratio .03*** .01*** .04***
[.00] [.00] [.00]
Creditor rights -.00*** .00*** -.00*** .01*** -.00*** .00***
[.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00]
Cash flow -.02*** .16*** -.01*** .23*** -.02*** .13***
[.00] [.00] [.00] [.01] [.00] [.01]
Market to book .01*** .04*** .01*** .05*** .01*** .03***
[.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00]
Property rights .01*** .01*** .01***
[.00] [.00] [.00]
High tech industries .05*** .03*** .05***
[.00] [.00] [.00]
Ownership -.01*** -.01*** -.01***
[.00] [.00] [.00]
R&D Intensity 1.85*** 1.83*** 1.81***
[.03] [.07] [.03]
Size -.03*** -.04*** -.03***
[.00] [.00] [.00]
Adverse selection -2.60*** -3.04*** -2.53***
[.04] [.07] [.04]
Adjusted R square .31 .22 .22 .28 .32 .20
# of observations 141,242 141,242 80,826 80,826 110,791 110,791
Panel D: Bank-based countries Panel E: Developed countries Panel F: Developing countries
R&D Intensity Equity Ratio R&D Intensity Equity Ratio R&D Intensity Equity Ratio
Intercept -.02*** .93*** -.04*** .92*** -.01*** .97***
[.00] [.01] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.01]
Equity ratio .01 .04*** .01***
[.00] [.00] [.00]
Creditor rights .00*** .00 -.00*** .01*** -.00** -.00†
[.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00]
Cash flow .05*** .45*** -.02*** .12*** .01** .54***
[.01] [.02] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.02]
Market to book .00*** .06*** .01*** .03*** .00*** .07***
[.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00] [.00]
Property rights .01*** .01*** .00***
[.00] [.00] [.00]
High tech industries .02*** .06*** .01***
[.00] [.00] [.00]
Ownership -.01*** -.02*** -.01***
[.00] [.00] [.00]
R&D Intensity 1.31*** 1.69*** .76*
[.13] [.03] [.31]
Size -.04*** -.03*** -.05***
[.00] [.00] [.00]
Adverse selection -3.70*** -2.39*** -3.33***
[.17] [.04] [.13]
Adjusted R square .24 .34 .32 .21 .15 .39
# of observations 30,451 30,451 116,149 116,149 25,093 25,093
This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions of equation 1 and 2. R&D Intensity and Equity Ratio are the two endogenous variables in the two stage regressions. Exact
definitions of the variables are given in Table 1. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects. The robust standard errors are reported below the estimated coefficients.
The symbols ***, **, *, and † denote statistical significance at .1 per cent, 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
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All the coefficients for the R&D intensity equation have
the expected sign except for the cash flow variable13. The
coefficient for the equity ratio is positive which indicates that
a greater use of equity is associated with more R&D inten-
sity. This result is consistent with Jensen and Showalter’s
(2004) conjecture. Firms residing in countries with strong
intellectual property rights have greater R&D intensity.
More investment opportunities, measured by the market to
book ratio, result in more R&D intensity. The coefficient is
positive for firms that belong to high tech industries that
historically have greater R&D intensity. The coefficient for
ownership is negative, consistent with the results of Yafeh
and Yosha (2003), which suggests that concentrated share-
holder ownership has a negative influence on R&D.
Equity Ratio Equation. Using the entire sample and the
entire sample minus US firms (Panels A and B), all the
coefficients for the equity ratio equation have the expected
signs in Table 4. Higher R&D intensity reduces the amount
of debt. This result is in line with many researchers who
have argued that debt should not be used, in general, to
fund R&D. Higher cash flows lead to a higher equity ratio.
This result is consistent with many studies that show
higher profitability results in lower debt ratios. Bigger
firms use relatively more debt, presumably because their
cash flows are more diversified and thus suffer less bank-
ruptcy risk. Greater investment opportunities result in
greater use of equity. Our proxy for adverse selection sug-
gests that firms with greater amounts of adverse selection
have lower equity ratios, which is consistent with the idea
that greater adverse selection costs increase the cost of
equity. The creditor rights variable has a significant posi-
tive coefficient. As discussed earlier, the expected sign
for this variable is ambiguous and researchers have found
different results.
Roughly 40 per cent of our entire sample is US observa-
tions and we address whether the relationships we find for
the entire sample also hold for the sample of non-US coun-
tries. All of the coefficients for both the R&D intensity equa-
tion and the equity ratio equation have the same signs in
Panels A and B. Our findings indicate that the US firms are
not driving our results.
Market-based vs. Bank-based Countries
R&D Intensity Equation. Table 4 also reports the results
for the comparison of market and bank-based countries. Our
most important result is that creditor rights has a negative
impact on R&D intensity for market-based countries (Panel
C) while for bank-based countries (Panel D), the relationship
is just the opposite as the coefficient on creditor rights is
positive. These results support hypothesis 2. In unreported
results, we add two variables to the regressions in Panel A.
The first is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is
located in a country that is market-based and zero other-
wise. The second is an interaction term and equals the
product of the market dummy variable and the creditor
rights variable. The coefficient on the interaction term is
negative and is significant at the one per cent level which
indicates that the negative effect of creditor rights is stronger
in market-based countries than in bank-based countries.
This result further supports Hypothesis 2.
The signs and significance of market to book, property
rights, high tech industries and ownership are the same for
market-based countries and bank-based countries and are
the same as those in Panels A and B. The impact of cash flows
on R&D intensity is different between bank-based (positive)
and market-based (negative) countries. The coefficient for
the equity ratio is positive for market-based countries
(similar to Panels A and B) but insignificant for bank-based
countries.
In unreported results, we also did a regression on the
R&D intensity equation using all the observations and
include a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is from
a market-based country. The coefficient on the dummy vari-
able is positive indicating, that all other things being equal,
firms in market-based countries have higher R&D intensity
than firms from bank-based countries.
Equity Ratio Equation. The results for the equity ratio
equation are similar for bank and market-based countries.
The only difference involves the impact of creditor rights on
the equity ratio. For market-based countries creditor rights
has a positive influence while it has an insignificant positive
impact in bank-based countries.
Additional Evidence: Developed vs.
Developing Countries
We next explore the possible influence of economic devel-
opment on our results. Is the effect of creditor rights on R&D
intensity different between developed and developing
countries? Are there differences between financing patterns
between the two sets of countries? Table 4 also gives the
results for developed (Panel E) and developing (Panel F)
countries.
R&D Intensity Equation. Our findings show that the
determinants of R&D intensity are similar between devel-
oped and developing countries. In particular, the effect of
creditor rights is negative and significant on R&D intensity
in both sets of countries. The only difference between the
determinants of R&D intensity is that cash flow has a nega-
tive effect on R&D intensity in developed countries but a
positive effect in developing countries.
Equity Ratio Equation. The determinants of the equity
ratio equation are the same for developing and developed
countries with one exception. Creditor rights have a positive
effect in developed countries and a negative effect in devel-
oping countries.
Creditor Rights for Healthy Firms vs.
Distress Firms
Our third hypothesis is that the negative effect of creditor
rights should be stronger for firms in distress or near dis-
tress than for healthy firms. We define firms that are in
distress or near distress when their yearly cash flows are
negative.
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Evidence for Hypothesis 3 is presented in Table 5. For
these R&D regressions, we replace the cash flow variable
with a dummy variable (Negative Cash Flow) that equals
one if the firm’s yearly cash flows are negative and zero
otherwise. We also add an interactive term (Negative Cash
Flow*Creditor Rights). The interactive term allows us to
examine the impact of creditor rights on R&D intensity
when the firm is in financial distress or near financial dis-
tress.14 The coefficient for the interaction term for all coun-
tries, developed countries, and market-based countries is
negative and significant, providing some support for
Hypothesis 3.
Country vs. Firm-level Determinants of R&D
Researchers have debated the importance of country vs. firm
factors in determining firm governance ratings. Doidge,
Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) find that country factors are much
more important in explaining governance ratings. They
argue that it is too expensive and almost impossible for
firms in countries with poor investor rights to be able to
convince investors that their firm has good corporate gover-
nance. Krishnamurti, Sevic, and Sevic (2005) also stress the
dominance of country factors while Durnev and Kim (2005)
argue for the importance of firm factors [need for external
financing, investment opportunities, and ownership struc-
ture (concentration of cash flow rights)]. Researchers have
also addressed the question as to whether firms with good
governance ratings perform better than companies with
worse ratings.15
We build on these prior studies and ask whether the deter-
minants of R&D intensity are more country specific or more
firm specific. In Table 6, we report regressions using just
country specific variables (creditor rights and intellectual
property rights), just firm specific variables (equity ratio,
cash flow, market to book, and ownership), and combined
country and firm variables. For these regressions, we control
for endogeneity by using the lags of the independent vari-
ables because it makes it easier to compare the combined
effects of the country specific variables with the combined
effects of the firm specific variables.
Table 6 indicates that both country and firm variables are
separately important in explaining R&D intensity but firm
variables appear collectively to be more important than
country variables as regressions employing firm variables
have higher adjusted R squares than those that just use
country variables. The table also highlights that the R
squares are higher for samples of market-based countries
than bank-based countries.
Robustness Test: Tobit Regressions
It is possible that there are a number of firms in our dataset
that do some R&D, but choose not to report it. As a result, we
present in Table 7 Tobit regressions for the R&D intensity
equation only (Equation 1). For each of our samples, we
present the results for two regressions. The first uses the
predicted values for the equity ratio instead of the actual
equity ratio. The predicted values are derived by using all of
the exogenous variables in Equations 1 and 2. The second
regression replaces the actual equity ratio by its lag one
period. Both regression equations try to tackle the endoge-
neity issue between R&D intensity and the equity ratio.
Our main result is that creditor rights have a negative
impact on R&D intensity for the entire sample, the entire
sample excluding the US, developed countries, and the
market-based countries. Creditor rights have a positive
influence on R&D intensity for bank-based countries (con-
sistent with the findings in Table 4).
The coefficients for the other variables are generally
similar to those found earlier. One difference involves the
equity ratio. When the lag of the equity ratio is used instead
of the actual equity ratio, the resulting coefficient is positive
implying the greater use of equity is associated with more
R&D intensity. However, when the actual equity ratio is
replaced by its predicted value, the resulting coefficient has
a negative sign. With a couple of exceptions, the signs and
significance of the other variables in the equation do not
change depending on whether the predicted equity ratio or
the lag of the equity ratio is used.
CONCLUSIONS
Previous papers have documented that managers often
undertake risk-reducing activities when faced with strong
creditor rights. These actions include diversifying acquisi-
tions, reducing cash flow risk, and lower leverage. Our
paper investigates the impact of creditor rights on another
corporate decision, namely R&D investments. We hypoth-
esize that firms residing in countries with strong creditor
rights will have lower levels of R&D intensity. We test this
hypothesis for firms in 41 countries and use a two-equation
framework with both R&D intensity and the equity ratio as
endogenous variables.
Our results are supportive of our main hypotheses. Credi-
tor rights are associated with reduced levels of R&D inten-
sity in all of our samples with the exception of bank-based
countries. We also find that the negative effect of creditor
rights on R&D intensity is usually stronger (more negative)
for firms facing or near financial distress. Managers of these
firms worry that their firms may soon face bankruptcy. As a
result, they undertake activities to reduce risk including lim-
iting R&D intensity.
Our results are very important because R&D is critical to
many countries. Any unnecessary or unintended decrease in
R&D can have major impacts for these countries. Our main
result that stronger creditor rights reduce R&D intensity has
important policy implications. Countries that have strong
creditor rights may want to think about policies (perhaps tax
policies) that could be used to stimulate R&D and thus offset
the reduction in R&D associated with strong creditor rights.
We also observe that the determinants of R&D intensity
are mostly the same for countries at different levels of devel-
opment or for countries with different economic systems
(bank or market-based). We find that patent rights, market to
book ratios, and equity ratios, all generally have a positive
impact on R&D intensity, while concentrated ownership on
the part of insiders and blockholders has a negative impact.
Both firm and country level variables help to explain R&D
intensity with firm level variables appearing to be more
important.
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The determinants of the equity ratio are also similar across
our samples. Cash flow, R&D intensity, and market to book
ratios have a positive effect on the firm’s use of equity, while
size and a measure of adverse selection tend to reduce the
amount of equity employed by firms.
We have examined the impact of creditor rights on R&D
intensity. We have not taken into consideration that coun-
tries may differ in the enforcement of these rights. Future
research might try to develop an index of enforcement of
creditor rights and see the impact of that variable on our
results. Another issue that we have not examined is whether
countries’ tax policies with respect to R&D are related to its
creditor rights. Are higher creditor rights associated with
more tax preferences for R&D? This issue is left for future
research.
We would like thank two anonymous reviewers, Associ-
ate Editor Praveen Kumar and the Editor, William Judge,
and the participants at the FMA 2010 European Meeting in
Hamburg, and at the EWGFM 2010 conference for their
helpful comments.
NOTES
1. Many studies have documented the importance of R&D for
economic growth. For the US see (Corrado, Hulten, & Sichel,
2009) and internationally see Goel and Ram (1994).
2. See http://www.battelle.org/aboutus/rd/2011.pdf.
3. Prior research has generally shown a significant market reac-
tion to increased R&D intensity. See, for example, Szewczyk,
Tsetsekos, and Zantout (1996) and Chan, Martin, and Kens-
inger (1990).
4. See also Harhoff (1998) for German firms, Bond, Harhoff, and
Van Reenen (1999) for UK and German firms and Mulkay, Hall,
and Mairesse (2001) for French and US manufacturing firms.
5. On a related topic, see also Cescon (2002) for a study on
whether managers are guided primarily by short-term goals in
Italy.
6. Prior studies using public bond covenants, as opposed to
private credit agreements, did not find very many restrictions
on investments (Billett, King, & Mauer, 2007; Smith & Warner,
1979).
7. Our research in some ways resembles Acharya et al. (2011).
They are concerned with output measures of R&D while we
focus on input measures.
8. For a review of this literature see Allen and Gale (1999) and
Beck and Levine (2002).
9. Kanwar and Evenson (2009) make the point that the agreement
on Trade Related Intellectual Property issues in 1994 brought
countries’ policies on property issues closer together but there
are still substantial differences between countries.
10. In an earlier version of this paper, we included shareholder
rights in the R&D equation. Our findings were generally sup-
portive of the idea that increased shareholder rights resulted in
more R&D. However, after including intellectual property
rights in the equation the relationship between shareholder
rights and R&D became very inconsistent. In the original
version we used four estimates for shareholder rights and all
showed a positive country correlation with our measure of
creditor rights (ranging between .16 and .44). Two of the four
estimates were significant. The correlation between share-
holder rights and intellectual property rights was positive but
insignificant.
11. Kaplan and Pathania (2010) make an interesting point. Firm
responses to perception-based indicators are often affected by
the strength of the economy. This should not be a problem in
our study since most of the explanatory variables are not
perception-based indicators and the other independent vari-
ables are country based ones that do not change much over
time.
12. Ideally we would like to have separate measures for ownership
for insiders and ownership by blockholders. Unfortunately the
data from Worldscope combines the two.
13. We argued previously that the effect of ownership on R&D
intensity is ambiguous.
14. In this case, the coefficient on the creditor rights term repre-
sents the impact of creditor rights on R&D intensity when the
cash flows are positive. The impact of creditor rights on R&D
intensity when the cash flows are negative is the sum of the
coefficient on creditor rights term plus the interaction term
(Negative Cash Flow*Creditor Rights).
15. Ertugrul and Hegde (2009) find little systematic relationship
between governance ratings and firm performance. On the
other hand, Renders, Gaeremynck, and Sercu (2010) observe
after controlling for endogeneity and selection bias, that there
is a positive relationship between governance ratings and per-
formance. Renders et al. (2010) review the literature and report
prior studies generally show a positive relationship between
good governance and performance.
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